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Party and Public Ideals in Conflict:
Constitutionalism and Civil Rights
in the USSR
Introduction
The Soviet system is presently in transition from what Gorbachev has
termed the "old" Constitution to the "new" Constitution.' In the area
of civil rights during this interregnum, populist action is outstripping
legislative initiative with the result that de facto rights "from below" are
in collision with dejure rights "from above." In effect, Communist Party
and mass public ideals are in conflict in the USSR.
During the past five years, Gorbachev and the Party have lost con-
trol of the legal reform process, as well as the "restructuring" program
in general. Gorbachev has promoted the ideals of "'glasnost," or open-
ness, and "democratization," or greater civic participation in the public
arena, which were initially ill-defined and sloganistic. 2 The Soviet
leader promised legislation to institutionalize these ideals. An ambi-
tious legislative agenda was published in 1986 and timetables for various
projects were announced. 3 However, the legislative process dragged on
and projected deadlines passed, while Gorbachev's "hot" rhetoric con-
tinued to raise the public's political, economic, and legal expectations.
Consequently, diverse activists from below began to translate glasnost
and democratization into actual practice without awaiting legislative
institutionalization. In effect, the Party has been confronted with street
democracy and spontaneous legal reform as the public continues to
appropriate promised rights without formal empowerment. In the pro-
cess, Gorbachev and the reform leadership soon found the limits and
boundaries of their vague conceptions of glasnost and democratization
* Professor of Political Science, Union College. B.A., Brandeis; M.A., Ph.D.,
Indiana.
1. See Excerpts From a Speech by Gorbachev Before the Lithuanian Communists, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1990, at A9, col. 4.
2. See M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE
WORLD 75-80 (1987).
3. See PARTY, STATE, AND CITIZEN IN THE SOVIET UNION: A COLLECTION OF Docu-
MENTS 30-36 (M. Matthews ed. 1989) (English translation of the agenda).
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being tested, probed and, more recently, even exceeded by questing citi-
zens throughout the Soviet Union. All of this has engendered a con-
servative backlash among Party members, the bureaucracy, and legal
professionals which has further delayed certain key new laws in the area
of civil rights.4 Currently, the conflict between the Party and the public
over the scope and meaning of the new revolutionary ideals is becoming
progressively more acute and, in some parts of the country, even
violent.5
Constitutionally and legislatively, the USSR changed very little from
the late 1970s to 1990; yet actual application of the existing laws has
changed dramatically under Gorbachev since 1986. This Article exam-
ines the recent Soviet movement toward constitutional government and
codification of basic civil rights by first identifying the historical methods
of social and political control prevalent since the time of Stalin.
Although Stalin's jurisprudence of terror evolved into Brezhnev's more
subtle forms of administrative and judicial political justice, both instilled
fear in the general populace and held it in check. Part II of this Article
discusses causes and effects of both Gorbachev's push for glasnost and
democratization and the overeager response of the general populace to
new freedoms. The gradual erosion of fear among the masses substan-
tially contributed to the expansion of civil rights. Gorbachev's legitima-
tization of aggressive social and political behavior also encouraged the
current conflict between law and public ideals. Finally, the Article sug-
gests that de facto rights from below are outpacing the de jure rights
granted by the authorities. The Soviet regime is losing influence within
its borders as social behavior swirls out of control.
I. Civil Rights in the USSR: Soviet Control of Social Behavior
A. Background: Theoretical Underpinnings and the Jurisprudence of
Terror
1. Theoretical Underpinnings of Civil Restrictions on Speech and Assembly
Flowing from the Marxian emphasis on historical materialism founded
on the precedence of thing over idea and base over superstructure,
Soviet human rights theory has always given preeminence to economic
and social rights over the political and civil rights favored by democratic
societies. The USSR Constitution of 1936 incorporated this perspective
into Soviet constitutional doctrine. This document, the Stalin Constitu-
tion, guaranteed the citizen a broad spectrum of economic and social
rights, offering only a limited and qualified list of political and civil
4. As of early 1990, the promised statutes on glasnost, the press, the archives, and
the "informals" (as the new independent groups are called) were several years
behind schedule.
5. Since the inception of perestroika, there have been serious outbreaks of vio-
lence in the following union republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakstan,
Moldavia, Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan.
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rights.6 The latter, inscribed in article 125, included the familiar rights
of speech and assembly, but were abridged by the requirement that their
legitimate exercise had to serve to "strengthen the socialist system."
This requirement was another way of saying that the citizen who chooses
to be venturesome must reinforce the status quo through his or her civic
behavior. The Party, as the sovereign authority and ultimate legislator,
defined the status quo. Nonconforming civic behavior during the Stalin
era meant courting long imprisonment or even death; hence, the vast
majority of people remained silent and assembled only in approved
places under official auspices.
The Stalin Constitution with its truncated "bill of rights" remained
in effect for over four decades, well beyond Stalin's death in 1953.
Khrushchev eventually established a constitutional commission to draft
a new constitution; however, the work was still incomplete upon his
ouster from office in October of 1964. 7 The new Brezhnev leadership
adopted different priorities, so the constitutional work continued spo-
radically for years in rather desultory fashion, finally producing a new
Constitution in 1977.8 The Stalin Constitution's assumptions about
human rights priorities remained intact in the Constitution of 1977.
While the new Constitution amplified the range of guaranteed material
rights, the only change in the civil rights language was detrimental. The
old Stalinist article 125 became new article 50, but with an additional
criterion further encumbering the enumerated rights. Now a citizen had
to not only "strengthen," but also to help "develop" the socialist system
through any exercise of his/her right of speech, assembly, press, mass
meetings, or demonstrations. 9
2. The Birth of Public Activism in the Post-Stalin Years
In the intervening years prior to the new Constitution, social attitudes
changed and a small number of citizens, mainly the well-educated and
working intellectuals, began to assert themselves by speaking or writing
critically about public affairs and even occasionally demonstrating in
protest of a Party policy.10 Khrushchev's political demise, signalling the
end of any hopes for reform for a generation to come, was in large part
the catalyst for the new Soviet human rights activism. Though tentative
and modest in scope in the latter half of the 1960s, the activism grew
into a loose yet discernible movement in the 1970s, with a mainstream
of political and civil rights dissent fed by tributaries of ethnic and reli-
gious dissidence. Although they generally operated as individuals or in
6. Compare articles 118-22 of the 1936 USSR Constitution (socio-economic
rights) with article 125 (civil and political rights), reprinted in A. UNGER, CONSTITu-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 155-56
(1981).
7. See Events Leading to Khrushchev's Ouster Reported, Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service [FBIS],JPRS Report, Soviet Union: Political Affairs, Dec. 20, 1989, at 72.
8. See R. SHARLET, THE NEW SOVIET CoNsTrrrrTON OF 1977, at 1-6 (1978).
9. Id. at 93.
10. See L. ALEXEYEVA, SovIET DISSENT 3-18 (1985).
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small groups, the activists gained visibility (at least in the West) well
beyond their numbers by surreptitiously circulating uncensored infor-
mation among themselves and abroad through an elaborate clandestine
network of unofficial journals and other publications called
"samizdat."" Soviet authorities needed new ways to deal with this
activism.
3. The Machinery of Social Control
Using the machinery of justice for political purposes dates back to the
inception of the Soviet system in 1917. Lenin, and later Stalin, created a
"jurisprudence of terror"'12 which dominated Soviet public life well into
the mid-1950s. As the Party under Khrushchev diminished the use of
terror as a routine instrument of governance, a post-Stalin paradigm for
social control and repression began to emerge.' 3 This paradigm
included four broad policy types designed to protect and defend the
political and social status quo from any unauthorized internal attempts
at change. For the masses, there were first policies to promote "social
pacification through consumption," e.g., subsidized and fixed prices for
certain basic foodstuffs and an array of social welfare programs. Implicit
in the pacification process was an unwritten social contract between the
Party-State and the citizen by which the former granted economic and
social rights in return for the consensual waiver of political and civil
rights; in effect, the tradeoff was economic goods for political quies-
cence. The second line of defense, specifically addressed to the creative
intelligentsia, was "repressive tolerance," an arrangement through
which creative expression was confined within politically-defined param-
eters in return for generous creature comforts. 14 The rationale for
these policies on the arts was to control, exploit, and buy-off an articu-
late and influential, and therefore potentially troublesome, part of the
population.
The remaining two policies of the post-Stalin paradigm involved
more active measures of social control in instances when pacification or
repressive tolerance failed to completely contain their respective target
constituencies. First, "differentiated political justice" was primarily
fashioned to deal with citizens, especially intellectuals, who insisted on
crossing the intangible line between private complaint and public criti-
cism. This group of citizens was never large, hence political justice was
meted out differentially depending on the offender, the intent, and the
11. See F. FELDBRUGGE, SAMIZDAT AND POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION ch.
1(1975).
12. See Sharlet, Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture, in STALINISM: ESSAYS IN HISTORI-
CAL INTERPRETATION 163-68 (R. Tucker ed. 1977).
13. See Sharlet, Varieties of Dissent and Regularities of Repression in the European Commu-
nist Slates, in DISSENT IN EASTERN EUROPE 10-14 (J. Curry ed. 1983).
14. The term was conceptualized by the late Western Marxist philosopher Her-
bert Marcuse. For the best analysis of the concept as government policy, see M.
HARASZTI, THE VELVET PRISON: ARTISTS UNDER STATE SOCIALISM (1987).
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offense, in contrasf to the generally standardized political justice of the
Stalin era.
The final line of defense of the ideological realm existed to resist
aggregate unrest and mass action. This was the use of troops or large-
scale paramilitary action to carry out "suppression through main force,"
which was rarely resorted to in the post-Stalin, pre-Gorbachev years.
Such infrequency evinced the general effectiveness of the first three poli-
cies in muting, muffling, and occasionally repressing challenges to the
status quo. Those who did fall victim to differentiated political justice or
main force were usually attempting to exercise civil rights - disap-
proved speech in a censored society and/or unlawful assembly in a
closed public arena.
B. Political Justice Under Brezhnev
The Brezhnev regime did not remain impassive in the face of challenges
to the Party's monopoly on political thought and expression, be they
spoken, written, or imagined. To contain the problem, a diverse set of
policies was gradually developed and perfected in the spirit of differenti-
ated political justice. Whereas the prior Stalinist political justice was
metaphorically a blunt instrument applied with few distinctions to all
who fell within its purview, Brezhnevist political justice was a complex
mechanism which could be fine-tuned to apply to the wide variety of
dissidents and dissent appearing in the twenty years spanning the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s. Brezhnevist political justice can be divided into
its administrative and judicial components. 15
1. Administrative Political Justice
Administrative political justice was predominantly carried out by the
state bureaucracy. It took the form of an ad hoc, arbitrary bureaucratic
action against an individual or group deemed politically deviant from
the prevailing norms of Soviet society. There were four patterns of
administrative action: bureaucratic deprivation, official hooliganism,
psychiatric internment, and forced expatriation.
a. Bureaucratic Deprivation
Bureaucratic deprivation was. the most commonly used form of retaliation
against dissidents and other nonconformists, including SovietJews seek-
ing to emigrate. Official actions ranged from petty harassment, such as
the suspension of telephone service, to more consequential deprivations
such as job dismissal, eviction, and preventing a dissident's child from
entering the university. These actions were usually carried out anony-
mously as if by the "invisible hand" of bureaucratic arbitrariness; hence,
it was difficult if not impossible to identify a responsible official for the
purpose of petitioning for relief. If available and necessary, the authori-
15. Sharlet, Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 33 INT'LJ.
763, 775 (1978).
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ties would invoke an appropriate law for their action. 16 In most such
cases they did not and there was no recourse to the courts. Although
article 58 of the 1977 Constitution provided for judicial review of
administrative action, 17 the necessary enabling legislation was never
enacted in the Brezhnev or immediate post-Brezhnev eras. 18
b. Official Hooliganism
Official hooliganism was sometimes employed as follow-up retaliation
when one or another bureaucratic deprivation did not deter the
intended person from an offending pattern of behavior. This action
entailed the use of the police, either uniformed or plainclothes, to
openly or surreptitiously intimidate an individual. The intimidation
could take the form of a physical threat or assault, a covert mugging
without robbery, or in a few impossible-to-prove cases, extra-judicial
execution. The government's objective was to mask this form of deter-
rence as common "hooliganism," and to deny the victim's recourse of a
criminal complaint by having official personnel carry out the actions.1 9
c. Psychiatric Internment
Psychiatric internment was a third option available to the authorities in
their quest to contain political deviance. This option involved arranging
the commitment of an individual to a hospital for the criminally
insane.20 Such a commitment required a hearing in a criminal court,
which by pre-arrangement became a judicial formality. Once commit-
ted, the mentally healthy victim was inevitably subjected to a cruel and
painful pharmacological "treatment" until the "patient" either recanted
the politically unhealthy views or was released through the persistent
intervention of international human rights organizations or Western
political parties or governments.2 1
16. For instance, job dismissal was a common administrative sanction for dissi-
dents or would-be emigrants. On these occasions presumably, so-called "instructive
law" from behind the scenes directed the administrator's interpretation of articles 17,
51, 52, and 56 of the federal labor law principles as implemented in the individual
labor codes of the union republics. See THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: LEGISLATION AND
DOCUMENTATION 588, 596-97 (W. Butler comp. & trans. 1978). In a politically-moti-
vated dismissal, there was almost invariably no hope of redress in the courts, which in
such cases would receive their instructions via the telephone.
17. R. SHARLET, supra note 8, at 94-95.
18. See Barry, Administrative Justice and Judicial Review in Soviet Administrative Law, in
SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN - PART II: SOCIAL ENGINEERING THROUGH LAW 257-59 (D.
Barry, G. Ginsburgs, & P. Maggs eds. 1978).
19. For the relevant experience of Valery Panov, a Soviet Jewish ballet dancer
who had expressed the wish to emigrate, see V. PANOv, To DANCE 323-24 (1978).
20. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: How SOVIET PSYCHIATRY
Is USED TO SUPPRESS DISSENT chs. 3 & 5 (1977); H. FIRESIDE, SOVIET PSYCHOPRISONS
chs. 2 & 3 (1979).
21. On the Grigorenko case, see P. GRIGORENKO, MEMOIRS ch. 26 (1982).
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d. Forced Expatriation
Forced expatriation was a fourth and more exclusive method of administra-
tive political justice. This method was usually only utilized against dissi-
dents who had been undeterred by bureaucratic deprivation and/or
official hooliganism, but were too prestigious or highly visible in the
West to be subjected to psychiatric internment or to be bound over for
judicial political justice. Forced expatriation involved an edict by the Pre-
sidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet depriving the individual of citizen-
ship, thus setting the stage for expulsion from the country. Another
variation involved allowing the person to travel to the West on business
and carrying out the denaturalization while he/she was abroad, effec-
tively preventing re-entry into the USSR. Some of the most notable vic-
tims of this form of administrative retaliation are the physicist Chalidze,
the cellist Rostropovich, and the novelist Solzhenitsyn.2 2
2. Judicial Political Justice
For those political deviants who could not be discouraged by the admin-
istrative methods or whose offense was considered egregious, the
Brezhnev regime reserved judicial political justice. Judicial political jus-
tice was achieved either through the use of a criminal trial as a surrogate
political trial, or by means of a direct political trial. 23
Just as higher political authority directed the application of adminis-
trative political justice, such authority secretly directed the judges and
prosecutors in both venues of judicial political justice. This surrepti-
tious manipulation of the machinery of justice for the purpose of neu-
tralizing a challenger to the status quo was called "telephone law," since
it usually involved a Party official fixing the trial by telephoning a direc-
tive to the court.24 Predictably, the trial result was always a guilty ver-
dict and, often, a pre-determined sentence as well.
a. Criminal Trial
The criminal trial approach to stifling dissidence was perhaps the most
pernicious and most difficult for the accused to defend against. This
route of judicial persecution was usually taken against obscure dissi-
dents or would-be emigrants. Occasionally, however, the authorities
would press criminal charges against the better known activists in order
to deny them the more visible public platform of a full-scale political
trial. In either case, the authorities' purpose in bringing criminal
22. For an account of his expatriation and denaturalization, see A. SOLZHENrrSYN,
THE OAK AND THE CALF: A MEMOIR 397-450 (1980).
23. On the two types of trials as political justice, see 0. KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL
JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS 47-53 (1961).
24. For example, in the Pinkhasov case, the judge had obviously already received
his instructions. He directed one of the people's assessors, or co-judges, to offer the
accused a covert plea bargain during a recess. The deal offered (and rejected) was
renounce the desire to emigrate to Israel and the (false) criminal charges would be
dropped. T. TAYLOR, A. DERSHOWITZ, G. FLETCHER, L. LIPSON & M. STEIN, COURTS
OF TERROR: SOVIET CRIMINALJUSTICE ANDJEWISH EMIGRATION 56-58, 168-69 (1976).
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charges for political activity was to deny the activist the high moral
ground of peaceful protest by demeaning the individual with common
criminal charges. In all of these cases, the charges were based either on
technical violations of the criminal law2 5 or, more commonly, on false
charges of criminal behavior. 26 While the former type of charge was
difficult to defend against, the latter was virtually impossible given the
fact that witnesses were suborned to give false testimony against the
accused. 2 7
b. Political Trial
1. Applicable Code Provisions
Whereas various ordinary charges, such as hooliganism or even rape,
were used in the criminal trials of the politically deviant, the main polit-
ical trials relied on just two articles of the criminal code.28 To use as a
referent the Russian Republic Criminal Code, the model for other
republican codes, the articles pertaining to political crime were article
70 and article 190-1.29
The regime's most formidable legal weapon against dissent was
article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and its equivalents in other
republican codes. Entitled "Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda,"
article 70 was a broadly-written subversion law encompassing a wide
variety of oral or written speech deemed by the authorities to be hostile
to the state or to the social system of the USSR. This article also
embraced anti-Party criticism, since the Communist Party's classification
as a social organization qualifies it as part of the Soviet social system.
Regardless of the form of the unlawful behavior, the prosecution theo-
retically had to prove there was an intent to subvert or weaken the
25. On the Liubarskii case, see CHRONICLE HUM. RTs., nos. 5-6, at 42-47 (Nov.-
Dec. 1973).
26. In the Stern case, the judge privately said to the accused during a recess, "Dr.
Stem, you are not guilty, but I am forced to convict you. I have a family and children.
I want to live too." THE USSR vs. DR. MIKHAIL STERN 2 (A. Stem ed. 1977) (emphasis
added).
27. See The Trial of Chornovil, A CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS, no. 57, at 95-98
(1981).
28. In addition, trials of purely religious dissidents were usually processed under
two other articles. These are the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Crimi-
nal Code [RSFSR CC] article 142 ("Violation of Laws on Separation of Church and
State and of Church and School"), and article 227 ("Infringement of Person and
Rights of Citizens Under the Appearance of Performing Religious Ceremonies"). See
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 169, 192 (H. Berman 2d
ed. 1972).
29. Id. at 153-54, 180-81. Less frequently used was RSFSR CC 190-3 entitled
"Organization of, or Active Participation in, Group Actions which Violate Public
Order." Id. at 181. Article 190-3 was intended to prevent and, if necessary, punish
those involved in the occasional vigil or small-scale demonstration outside of a court-
house by sympathizers of a dissident who was on trial inside. The charge was not
brought in most such cases, and since there were rarely, if at all, any other unauthor-
ized public demonstrations in Soviet society up to the mid-1980s, the law was not
used on a regular basis in the regime's struggle against political deviance.
Vol 23
1990 Party and Public Ideals
"Soviet regime."3 0 Once guilt was established by the court, a foregone
conclusion in political cases, the sanctions were relatively severe by
Soviet norms. The maximum penalty for a first offender was seven years
imprisonment followed by five years internal exile in a remote, isolated
place.
Prosecutions for subversion produced many prisoners of con-
science from among the ranks of the human rights activists in the late
1960s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s.3 1 In 1984, during Andropov's
brief term in office, the government amended the subversion law by
enlarging its scope. The amendment added a new aggravating circum-
stance which mandated stricter punishment for first offenders when the
subversion was "perpetrated with the use of financial means or material
valuables received from foreign organizations or from persons acting in
the interest of those organizations." 3 2 The amendment was aimed at
the unofficial liaison people in the USSR who served as vital links
between Western supporters and Soviet Jewish refuseniks,33 fundamen-
talist Christians, and mainline political dissidents.
The companion law used to restrain political activism was article
190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and its equivalent in the other
republican codes. The Soviets introduced this article into the criminal
law in 1966 by way of amendment in order to facilitate political prosecu-
tions. The new law, entitled "Circulation of Fabrications Known to Be
False Which Defame the Soviet State and Social System," 3 4 was
designed to punish seditious behavior. It alleviated the task of the pros-
ecution and the court in political cases because it did not require proof
of intent for conviction. The prosecution merely had to proffer evi-
dence that the citizen had engaged in seditious speech, or that the citi-
zen had prepared or merely circulated material considered by the
authorities to be politically defamatory. While prosecution and convic-
tion of dissidents under this law presumably required less investigative
energy than subversion cases, the permissible sanctions were also less
severe. The maximum penalty was three years incarceration. However,
since numerous dissidents and others were involved in typing and
covertly distributing samizdat or unofficial literature, the sedition law
added substantially to the number of political prisoners in the USSR.
30. Id. at 153-54.
31. Amnesty International, which has rigorous standards of verification before
"adopting" a prisoner of conscience, worked on approximately 350 political cases in
the USSR during 1978. See AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1978, at 244 (1979).
32. See R. Sharlet, Human Rights and Repression in the USSR Under Andropov, U.S.
Information Agency Wireless File, ADDENDUM, no. 32, at 7 (Apr. 6, 1984).
33. Refusenik was an informal term coined to describe a SovietJewish citizen who
applied to emigrate to Israel and was refused permission several times.
34. SovIEr CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES, supra note 28, at
180-81.
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2. Comparison to Criminal Trials
The twin laws of political repression nearly always resulted in a political
trial for either subversion or sedition. Occasionally, a charge of sedition
was combined with an ordinary criminal charge, producing a hybrid
criminal-political trial. 3 5 Most often, though, the government indicted
offending individuals exclusively on political charges. A political trial
differed from a criminal trial qua political trial in several ways. First, the
regime had decided to accord the offender the status of a political oppo-
nent rather than to debase the person as a common criminal. Secondly,
because the accused had actually behaved in a politically unacceptable
way, the charges under the relevant law were not grossly falsified.
Finally, because the political activist usually took pride in and responsi-
bility for his actions, he had a better opportunity to mount a defense (at
least symbolically since guilt was politically predetermined) than the
political victim of a criminal trial.
3. Illustrations
Many celebrated cases could be cited, but a brief discussion of only a
pair should suffice to demonstrate political prosecutions at work in the
pre-Gorbachev period. In August of 1968, a small band of intrepid
Soviet dissidents gathered in Moscow's Red Square to conduct a peace-
ful protest demonstration against an official Soviet policy, at that time an
unheard of event. The occasion was the recent USSR-Warsaw Pact inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia to bring an end to the reform communism pro-
gram of Alexander Dubcek, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party. The Soviet dissidents, Pavel Litvinov and others,
chose to protest the invasion by displaying several unauthorized plac-
ards and signs containing critical speech. The KGB plainclothesmen
who routinely patrol Red Square moved in quickly to forcibly break up
the demonstration, which was over in a matter of minutes. The govern-
ment brought charges comprised of a combination of RSFSR CC articles
190-336 and 190-1. The protestors had participated in a group action
which violated public order (hence art. 190-3), and in the process dis-
played such seditious slogans as "Down with the Occupiers," "Freedom
for Dubcek," and "For Your Freedom and Ours" - which were consid-
ered false and defamatory (hence art. 190-1).37
The second case demonstrates one avenue of defense frequently
adopted by bold and determined political defendants. The Soviets usu-
ally did not engage a political trial for just any human rights activist. As
indicated above, the regime had at its disposal a number of methods for
deterring aberrant behavior. The political trial route, which tended to
consume enormous amounts of investigative energy, was normally
reserved for the better-known political offenders whom we might
35. CHRONICLE HUM. RTS., supra note 25.
36. See supra note 29.
37. See UNCENSORED RUSSIA: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION 113 (P.
Reddaway ed. 1972).
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describe as defendants of stature. 38 As such, these defendants customa-
rily regarded the courtroom as an extension of the political arena and as
an ideal platform from which to project their contrary views. The court
would rarely countenance open political comments by the accused, how-
ever, so the commonly used method of defense by dissidents was to put
"socialist legality" itself on trial.39 This technique entailed using Soviet
constitutional and code law against the trial court by citing the politi-
cally-inspired violations of the defendant's constitutional and due pro-
cess rights. Perhaps no one was more skilled in this legalistic defense
against political arbitrariness than Vladimir Bukovsky.
Vladimir Bukovsky, a persistent public critic of the Soviet system,
was arrested in 1971 and charged under RSFSR CC article 70 with sub-
version. His offense was that he had given an unauthorized interview to
an American reporter in which he critically discussed the political abuse
of psychiatry in the USSR. The main count in the indictment was that he
had transmitted anti-Soviet information abroad. As with all other dissi-
dents subject to prosecution,the court convicted Bukovsky at his trial in
1972.
Bukovsky's case demonstrates the legalistic style of defense fre-
quently used by activists confronted with Soviet political justice. By the
time Bukovsky was brought to court in early 1972, he had earned a clas-
sification as a political recidivist. He had previously been convicted in
1967 for publicly protesting the passage of articles 190-1 and 190-3, for
criticizing article 70's breadth and arbitrariness, and for insisting that all
three laws were "unconstitutional," i.e., incompatible with the "bill of
rights" inscribed in article 125 of the then controlling 1936 Constitu-
tion. Bukovsky had continued to argue these points in court, but of
course to no avail.40 Later, in his 1972 trial for violating article 70,
Bukovsky raised the legalistic defense to a fine art. After the indictment
was read, Bukovsky made no less than eight pre-trial motions. The first
pointed out the imprecision in the indictment and requested that the
trial judge remand the case for further investigation. The other seven
motions cited numerous procedural irregularities in the investigation.
Not surprisingly, all motions but the last, asking that certain unanswered
complaints be entered into the record, were denied. At the close of the
trial, Bukovsky exercised his right as a defendant to a final statement
before the court retired to deliberate its foreordained "political" ver-
dict. Using his statement to rebut the prosecution's case as well as to
call attention to additional procedural infringements, Bukovsky
concluded:
However long I may have to spend in prison, I will never renounce my
beliefs. I will express them, exercising the right given to me by Article
38. See 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 23, ch. 6.
39. See Weiner, Socialist Legality on Trial, in QUEST OFJUSTICE: PROTEST AND Dis-
SENT IN THE SovIET UNION TODAY 39-51 (A. Brumberg ed. 1970).
40. See The Moscow Trials of 1967, in QUEST OF JUSTICE: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN
THE SOVIET UNION TODAY, 79-89 (A. Brumberg ed. 1970).
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125 of the Soviet Constitution, to all who wish to listen to me. I will fight
for legality and justice.4 '
II. The Gorbachev Era, Conflict Between De Facto and De Jure Civil
Rights
A. Perestroika and the Erosion of Fear
1. Overview
Clearly, much of what has occurred in the USSR in the past several years
under the rubric of social reform has been the unintended and even
unwanted outcome of Gorbachev's program of perestroika or restructur-
ing, especially in the area of speech and assembly. Perhaps the one fac-
tor which has contributed most substantially to the enormous ad hoc
expansion of these civil rights has been the gradual erosion of fear in the
mind of the Soviet public. Prior to 1985, the USSR Constitution of
1977 provided only pro forma rights of speech and assembly, subject to
caveats rendering them useless to the average citizen.4 2 For those few
individuals, usually dissidents or non-conformists of one kind or
another, who nonetheless chose to speak or assemble publicly without
authorization, the regime deployed an array of administrative as well as
judicially-administered political techniques to contain maverick behav-
ior.43 For the vast majority of the population, including those who may
have only contemplated public criticism of the status quo, the fear of
losing one's job, incarceration, or institutional commitment was usually
sufficient to deter ideological deviance and maintain political
acquiescence.
Yet, there has been a dramatic change in attitudes toward critical
public expression in the course of the past five years. As the USSR Min-
ister of Internal Affairs recently stated, referring to the previous general
proscription against "anti-Soviet" agitation and propaganda, "Now
there is anti-Soviet propaganda on every street comer - and those who
are" engaging in it are free."'4 4 Clearly, the catalyst has been
Gorbachev's repeated invitations to the masses to begin to exercise their
political rights to freer speech and more assembly under the aegis of
glasnost and democratization. Probably Gorbachev's first formal confer-
ral of these rights was in his lengthy report to the 27th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in early 1986.4 5 Subsequently,
41. The Case of Vladimir Bukovsky, 18 SURVEY, no. 2, at 158 (Spring 1972).
42. See article 50 of the USSR Constitution, reprinted in R. SHARLET, supra note 8, at
93.
43. See Sharlet, Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 33 INr'L
J. 763, 775-84 (1978).
44. Interior Minister on Perestroyka, Internal Security, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report: Soy. Union, Jan. 12, 1990, at 97 (hereinafter FBIS, Daily
Report: Sov. Union].
45. See Gorbachev's Political Report, in CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES IX: THE Docu-
MENTARY RECORD OF THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET
UNION 29-32 (1986).
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Gorbachev invoked these liberating ideas routinely in his speeches on a
variety of occasions, cited them in his 1987 book,46 and gave them par-
ticular emphasis in his major address at the special 19th Party Confer-
ence to promote restructuring in mid-1988.47 Glasnost began to flower,
first in the press, then spread to the sphere of culture, and, in recent
years, opened the economy, the legal system, and Soviet history to
greater scrutiny.48
Gorbachev's encouragement, combined with the more open press,
inspired the more politically conscious segment of the population to
take the idea of democratization seriously and to begin to act. Under-
standably, the initial steps toward public participation were timid; in the
absence of clearly defined guidelines from above, no one was sure of the
boundaries of official tolerance of activity independent of the Party.
Many of the first unofficial groups to organize undertook the task of pro-
moting the success of restructuring, or, staying well within the political
safety zone, formed groups around specific environmental issues - save
a coastline in one area,49 stop a nuclear plant in another.50 Encounter-
ing no serious objections from the authorities to their early lobbying,
groups began to merge, giving rise to the emergence of ethnic popular
fronts, most notably at first in the Baltic union republics, followed by the
Caucasian republics in the South, Moldavia, and finally the Slavic repub-
lics of Belorussia and the Ukraine.
Early in their respective developments, the ethnic popular fronts
successfully lobbied their republican supreme soviets or legislatures to
enact laws making the indigenous language of the ethnic majority, e.g.
Estonian, rather than Russian, the official working language of the
republic. By early 1990 thirteen of the fifteen union republics had
passed such language laws, to the discomfiture, one should note, of the
various and sometimes populous minorities living among the majority.51
Following the 1988 amendments to the USSR Constitution which
restructured the national legislative process and Soviet election law, the
most highly developed fronts in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania began to
function as surrogate opposition parties to the union republic commu-
nist parties. In the early 1989 elections to the newly-created Congress
of People's Deputies, the Baltic fronts' candidates generally trounced
46. See M. GORBACHEV, supra note 2.
47. See, e.g., the resolution on glasnost of the 19th Party Conference in PARTY,
STATE, AND CITIZEN IN THE SOVIET UNION: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS, supra note
3, at 156-59.
48. For discussion of the various forms of glasnost, see W. LAQOUEUR, THE LONG
ROAD TO FREEDOM: RUSSIA AND Glasnost (1989).
49. See THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY 214-15 (L.
Hajda & M. Beissinger eds. 1990).
50. See B. ELLOF, SOVIET BRIEFING: GORBACHEV AND THE REFORM PERIOD 138
(1989).
51. See FBIS, JPRS Report, Soviet Union: Political Affairs: Republic Language
Legislation, Dec. 5, 1989.
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their Party opponents. 52 Emboldened by this success, the Baltic fronts
began to work together in the Congress and in its smaller working legis-
lature, the Supreme Soviet, for greater economic autonomy for the
region. That autonomy was granted in the fall of 1989. 53 Since then,
populist calls for independence and secession from the USSR have been
heard in a number of the smaller union republics, most notably in Lithu-
ania.54 At the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, the most extreme
manifestation of democratization or unofficial public activism took place
in the southern republic of Azerbaijan. There, the popular front effec-
tively supplanted the Party as the actual governing agency in various
parts of the republic by recruiting many of its personnel to the ethnic
national cause.55
At each stage in the rapid evolution of democratization in the
USSR, Gorbachev tried to control it by slowing the process down or by
publicly resisting a specific trend - all to no avail. Faced with a series
of fail accompli, Gorbachev and the reform leadership have consistently
backed down, making policy out of the inevitable (the exceptions being
the introduction of troops into Azerbaijan in early 1990 to restore order
and presumably to try to regain control of a runaway republic, and the
pressures brought to bear on secessionist Lithuania during the spring).
As evidence that Gorbachev never anticipated how far a restless and
long suppressed public would carry their perceptions of glasnost and
democratization, he began in 1988 to lash out at certain groups as ethnic
extremists who, as the enemies of restructuring, were trying to under-
mine him politically and derail his reform program.5 6 Anti-restructur-
ing, in effect, began to supplant the term "anti-Soviet" in the official
Soviet lexicon of political deviance. 57
52. See Report by the Central Electoral Commission on the New Elections of USSR People's
Deputies Held After March 26, 1989,41 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, no. 20, at 26 (1989).
53. See Law on Baltic Republics' Shift to Economic Accountability Is Adopted, 41 CURRENT
DIG. Soy. PRESS, no. 37, at 13-15 (1989).
54. As of early 1990, calls for secession had been made by one group or another
in the following union republics: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Moldavia, and
Azerbaijan.
55. See, e.g., People's Front Holds 'All Authority'in Lenkoran, FBIS, Daily Report: Soy.
Union, Jan. 16, 1990, at 73-74.
56. Usually this meant that an ethnic group was using glasnost and democratiza-
tion in bolder ways than anticipated by Gorbachev. The leaders of the independent
Armenian movement for the annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbai-
jan were the first group to feel Gorbachev's wrath when they did not respond to
political entreaties to cease and desist.
57. In spite of his growing frustration with ethnic activism, Gorbachev used
repression very sparingly: against the leadership of the Armenian Karabakh group in
December 1988, and against selected leaders of the Azerbaijani Popular Front in Jan-
uary 1990. For a discussion of the relationship between republic struggles for
independance and human rights, see Goble, Federalism and Human Rights in the Soviet
Union, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 399 (1990).
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2. Slow Movement Toward Legitimization of Social Behavior Under the
Constitution and the Rule of Law
a. Symbolic Gestures
Gorbachev has become a strong proponent of constitutionalism in the
USSR and an ardent champion of civil rights for the Soviet citizen. He
has taken significant steps toward limited government, as expressed in
the concept of a "law-governed state,"15 8 and toward the impending
demise of the Party's constitutionally protected hegemony in the Soviet
system. 59 In addition, as discussed above, he has skillfully used his poli-
cies ofglasnost and democratization to pry open the closed society of the
Soviet Union. None of this was evident, however, during his first year in
office (1985-86), when the human rights scene remained bleak and unre-
lenting. At that time, the increasingly harsh repression policy of the
Brezhnev and Andropov years continued unchanged. The KGB was vig-
orously containing political, religious, and ethnic dissent as well as some
instances of aesthetic nonconformity.
Initially, the only relief in sight consisted of several symbolic ges-
tures in connection with the first Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Geneva
in the fall of 1985. Prior to and just after the summit, a number of long-
standing family reunification cases involving Soviet spouses of American
citizens were resolved, Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, was granted
temporary medical leave from their joint internal exile to go abroad for
treatment, and Sharansky, the leading Jewish emigration activist, was
prematurely released from prison and allowed to emigrate to Israel.
Skeptically, the West viewed these moves as merely traditional Soviet
summit-related gestures to Western public opinion rather than actual
changes in human rights policy.60
b. Major Policy Shifts
By late 1986, there were indications that the Gorbachev administration
was re-evaluating the cost-benefit ratio of repression. Major foreign
policy objectives began to take priority over the imperatives of domestic
social control, and Soviet repression policy gradually began to ease.
The second Reagan-Gorbachev Summit brought forth the usual human
rights gestures, but this time with a qualitative difference. Following the
Iceland Summit in late 1986, Sakharov and Bonner were released from
exile, and Gorbachev personally invited them back to Moscow to partici-
pate in the restructuring program. Upon Sakharov's arrival in the capi-
tal, he presented Gorbachev with a short list of long-suffering dissidents
58. See Marchenko, Problemy formirovaniia sotsialisticheskogo pravovogo gosudarstva,
VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSrrETA, SER. 11: PRAvo, no. 5, at 3-13 (1989); the
roundtable discussion Lichnost v sotsialisticheskogo pravovom gosudarstve, Soy. Gos. &
PRAvo, no. 10, at 28-36 (1989); and Alekseev, Na putiakh sozdaniia pravovogo
gosudarstva, PRAVOVEDENIE, no. 6, at 3-9 (1989).
59. See Clines, Soviet Leaders Agree to Surrender Communist Party Monopoly on Power,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
60. See R. Sharlet, Soviet Dissent Since Brezhnev, 85 CURRENT HisT. 324, 340 (1986).
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languishing in the prison camps. To the surprise of observers in the
USSR and abroad, the government responded in early 1987 by gradu-
ally releasing several hundred dissidents of all persuasions, followed by
the de-institutionalization of a substantial number of activists unjustly
interned in mental hospitals. Simultaneously, the number of new polit-
ical cases and trials began to diminish, initially in the Moscow and
Leningrad regions and then eventually elsewhere in the union. The
pace ofJewish, Armenian, and ethnic German emigration slowly started
to pick up as well. Clearly, human rights policy under Gorbachev was
beginning to change for the better, although the legislation hemming in
civil rights practice remained on the books.6 1
c. Ineffectual Lawmaking
While legislative 'review of the extant restrictive laws was promised,
Gorbachev's twin policies of glasnost and democratization rapidly began
to open up unimagined opportunities for the citizens' defacto rights of
freer speech and public assembly. To secure these new affirmative
rights, the government scheduled statutory codification of the twin poli-
cies. For instance, a set of laws on the new, more open Soviet informa-
tion policy - on glasnost, the press, and access to the state archives -
was projected for completion by the fourth quarter of 1987.62 However,
by 1990, a draft law on the press was under discussion in the Supreme
Soviet,63 the archives law was still in the drafting process, and the stat-
ute on glasnost was the furthest behind schedule with no indication of
when it would appear.
According to an early 1989 unofficial account, before the legislative
process was reformed, the glasnost statute was then in its sixth version
with each new draft more regressive.6 While Gorbachev's tenure has
produced economic legislation, the more sensitive social legislation is
emerging more slowly. Permitting more speech and freer assembly as a
matter of policy is one thing, but codifying glasnost and unofficial associa-
tional activity (the so-called "informal groups") in law and thereby insti-
tutionalizing these new civil rights has apparently given greater pause.
These are reportedly hotly conflicted issues between conservatives and
reformers in the legislative drafting process. 65
61. See, e.g., 9 HELP & AcTION NEWSLEFrER, no. 46, at 6 (Mar.-May 1987) (miscel-
laneous cases of political and religious dissent which arose in late 1986 and early
1987).
62. See PARTY, STATE AND CITIZEN IN THE SOVIET UNION: A COLLECTION OF DocU-
MENTS, supra note 3, at 31, 35.
63. Discussion of Draft Press Law in Supreme Soviet, 1 RADIO LIBERTY REPORT ON THE
USSR, no. 48, at 36 (Dec. 1, 1989).
64. This information was relayed to the author from a Soviet lawyer visiting the
United States.
65. Based on personal interviews with several Soviet jurists visiting the United
States in 1988-89.
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B. The Emerging Conflict Between Law and Public Ideals
1. Public Ideals Expressed by the Press, the Intelligentsia and the Masses
The public has not waited for formal empowerment to speak and assem-
ble in ways inconceivable just a few years ago. Glasnost has developed
exponentially and has made considerable progress toward fulfilling its
principal policy tasks of promoting self-government and realizing
human rights. 66  The three constituencies to whom Gorbachev
addressed the policy are carrying out these tasks: the press which has
been unleashed against the resistant bureaucracy, the intelligentsia
which has been enlisted in the cause of restructuring as public persuad-
ers, and the masses themselves whose public opinion has been stimu-
lated by both the press and the intelligentsia.
Gorbachev initially encouraged all three groups to seize the oppor-
tunity of glasnost, insisting in January 1988, for instance, that there were
"no limits to glasnost so long as it serves the interests of socialism." 67
Naturally, he intended that he and the leadership would define and
supervise the criteria for what served the interests of socialism, but the
policy of glasnost progressively flew out of his control. The press, freed
of pre-publication censorship, now competes vigorously among itself for
audience and functions as a key part of the emerging unwritten system
of checks and balances, prodding the Party and the legislature in various
directions. Sometimes chafing under pressure from the press,
Gorbachev has attempted several times to rein it in, but with little effect.
The only limitations seem to be self-censorship by the editors them-
selves and the Party's control over personnel appointments in the
media. Even the latter was revealed as a weak lever in 1989 when
Gorbachev tried unsuccessfully to get a critical editor to resign his
post. 68 Gorbachev has encountered similar problems with the intelli-
gentsia, which has grown steadily disenchanted with the slow pace of
restructuring and has begun to openly criticize Gorbachev in the press.
The new mass public opinion has presented Gorbachev with the
greatest problems. Beginning with the election campaign of winter-
spring 1989, people began publicly to say virtually anything they wanted
about the leadership, the Party, the Soviet system, and above all, the
deteriorating quality of life in the country. The public rhetoric has been
heated, as individuals and groups have used glasnost to legitimize and
pursue their often uncompromising private or non-negotiable ethnic
agendas. As the system of governance becomes less certain at the top,
the activities of many of the people below tear at the social fabric.
66. See PARTY, STATE AND CITIZEN IN THE SOVIET UNION: A COLLECTION OF Docu-
MENTS, supra note 3, at 156-59.
67. For an English translation of Gorbachev's speech on glasnost and the media,
see 40 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESs, no. 2, at 1-5, (esp. 4) (Feb. 10, 1988).
68. See 19 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, no. 1, at 41 (Jan. 1990) (brief account of
Gorbachev's effort to force the resignation of Vladislav Starkov, the critical editor of
Argumenty ifakty).
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2. Legal Responses
In the spring of 1989, the regime attempted to address the problem of a
fraying social order with new rules on speech. The Presidium of the
outgoing Supreme Soviet replaced the federal legislation underpinning
articles 70 and 190-1 with three new laws just before legislative restruc-
turing went into effect. The federal equivalent of article 70 was sup-
planted by a proscription against "Appeals for the Overthrow or
Alteration of the Soviet State and Social System" or against appeals for
changing the system "by means which are at variance with the USSR
Constitution."-69 The federal version of article 190-1 was replaced with
a comparably intolerant provision restricting the public from "Insulting
or Discrediting State Agencies and Social Organizations" and their offi-
cials. 70 An entirely new third law provided punishment for "Violation
of National and Racial Equality of Rights." 7 1
If anything, the initial two pieces of replacement legislation compli-
cated the task of policing the limits of speech under glasnost. A difficulty
inherent in the new "overthrow" law is that it relies on a constitutional
test at a time when the Soviet Constitution is in transition. The volumi-
nous reform legislation of the past several years has radically modified
or usurped many clauses of the prevailing 1977 Constitution. However,
much of the Constitution remains intact, including article 50 on speech
and assembly, awaiting an entirely new document, promised yet not
imminent.72 Meanwhile, even the courts restructured under the 1989
law on the status of judges73 are likely to find it difficult to fairly and
reasonably determine what speech is or is not anti-constitutional.
The "discrediting" law was even more seriously flawed. Its broad
proscription against criticizing public officials or organizations imposed
a virtual muzzle on the newly unleashed speech. Later that spring, the
first session of the newly-created Congress of People's Deputies
repealed the discrediting law and amended the new article 70 equivalent
69. See Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On Making Changes in and
Additions to the USSR Law 'on Criminal Liability for State Crimes' and Certain Other USSR
Legislative Acts, 41 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS, no. 15, at 11 (May 10, 1989).
70. Id.
71. Id. For further discussion of the three new federal rules, see J. Busuttil,
TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW: SovIET LEGAL REFORM AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER PER.
EsTRoiXa 116-21 (1989).
72. A drafting commission for a new constitution has been established and is at
work. However, because of the many other more urgent issues on the 1990 political
and legislative agenda, it is thought that completion of a new document will probably
take some time. Personal interview with a visiting Soviet jurist, early 1990.
73. The intention of the new law is to try to insulate the judge from extra-judicial
interference by moving judicial elections out of the judicial district to the next high-
est politico-administrative level, by extending the term of office, and by making the
use of political pressure on the bench a criminally liable act. It will remain to be seen
whether "telephone law" can be effectively disconnected in Soviet jurisprudence. See
Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law: An Overview, 23 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 205, 213-17 (1990).
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to specify "violent" overthrow of the system. Therefore, glasnost contin-
ues to promote generally unrestricted speech in the USSR.
3. The Dangerous Effects of De Facto, Rights Outpacing Law
The nearly unlicensed freedom of speech produced by glasnost has
spilled over into the field of democratization, first generating great
enthusiasm for independent groups to spontaneously organize and
assemble in public, then eventually in some parts of the country turning
into disorder, turmoil, and ultimately communal violence.
a. Socialist Pluralism
The operational core of the democratization policy has been
Gorbachev's oft-repeated phrase "Everything which is not prohibited by
law is allowed." 74 Citizen initiative created hundreds, then thousands of
groups which achieved the broad purposes of democratization - to
mobilize the public against the bureaucracy exercising a braking effect
on restructuring, and to involve people more and give them a greater
stake in the political system. The leadership's design was to encourage
"socialist pluralism,"' 75 or a community of groups well-disposed toward
the authorities and supportive of their program of restructuring. What
seems to be arising in Soviet society instead might be called a
"pluriverse" or "a dangerous jungle of self-interested partnerships,
shifting tactical alliances, open disagreements and outbreaks of violent
conflict." 7 6
b. The Limits of Toleration
Among the general population, democratization began slowly and cau-
tiously. No one had any sense of the extent of public activity the Party
and police would tolerate. Absent clear guidelines, the majority opted
for safety and waited for further developments. Two unanticipated
events which significantly stimulated the exercise of the new defacto right
of assembly were the small Crimean Tartar demonstration in 1987, and
74. See M. GORBACHEV, supra note 2, at 108. For a juridical explication of
Gorbachev's principle, see Matuzov, 0 printsipe 'vse, ne zapreshchennoe zakonom,
dozvoleno,' Soy. Gos. & PRAvo, no. 8, at 3-9 (1989).
75. As with other concepts launched "from above," socialist pluralism, too, has
gone awry with the emergence of right-wing groups in the USSR. See Riordan, Teen-
age Gangs, 'Afgantsy' and Neofascists, in SovIEr Youtm CULTURE 134-36 (J. Riordan ed.
1989).
76. J. KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SociEty 161 (1988). In an increasingly rare
display of civic comity if not true civic tolerance, the great Moscow demonstration
preceding the February 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee included up to
200,000 people of all hues and shades in the Soviet social spectrum. Marching
peacefully shoulder to shoulder outside the walls of the Kremlin were ecologists and
ethhic firsters, pro-semitic and anti-semitic groups, and even monarchists and anar-
chists. For that moment in time they joined in union for a common objective, to
show support for Gorbachev and the reformers' plan to have the plenum endorse the
revision of Article 6 of the Constitution on the leading role of the Party. Clines,
100,000 At Rally in Moscow Urge Democratic Changes; Crucial Party Talks Today, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
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later, the enormous demonstrations in Armenia in early 1988. The
Tartars had been illegally demonstrating and suffering repression since
the late 1960s. They were trying to gain permission to move back to
their traditional area in the Crimea from which Stalin had deported
them during World War 11.7 7 Taking Gorbachev's democratization
rhetoric at the 27th Party Congress seriously, some three hundred
Tartars gathered quietly in Red Square during the summer of 1987 and
surprised the passers-by as well as the Kremlin leadership by unfurling
banners lobbying their cause.7 8 Realizing that a "pandora's box" of
activist possibilities had been opened, the Moscow municipal authorities
soon after established rules for demonstrations in the capital, including
application lead times, parade permits, prohibited areas (such as Red
Square), and penalties for violators. 79 Other major population centers
followed suit as needed, and as the rate and scale of authorized and
unauthorized demonstrations burgeoned, all-union rules were enacted
in mid-1988.8 0 The new rules included much tougher penalties for vio-
lations of demonstration procedure, especially for repeat offenders.
Usually the police enforced demonstration law, but to back them up in
extraordinary situations, the government enhanced the powers of its
special corps of riot troops within the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
and began to use them more frequently. 8 '
The Armenian demonstrations of up to 500,000 people on behalf of
the annexation of a predominantly Armenian territory in neighboring
Azerbaijan,8 2 gave even greater impetus to democratization. Huge
demonstrations in the USSR have become commonplace since the
beginning of 1988, and on some occasions the popular fronts cannot
control the crowds, requiring in extreme cases rapid deployment of the
riot troops to restore order.8 3 More often than not, though, it is a police
problem.
To legitimate and regulate the incredible surge of independent
group behavior in the Soviet Union, the government promised a law
regarding unofficial groups. Subsequently, the government apparently
decided to merge legislation on both official and unofficial groups, and a
77. See L. ALEXEYEVA, supra note 10, ch. 7.
78. For the Soviet press reports on the demonstration, see THE USSR TODAY:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SovIET PRESS 99-100 (R. Ehlers 7th ed. 1988).
79. New Rules Set for Moscow Demonstrations, 39 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, no. 36, at
8 (Oct. 7, 1987).
80. See generally Handling Public Rallies and Protesters, 40 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS,
no. 34, at 1-5 (Sept. 21, 1988). On the resulting legislation, seeJ. BusuTIL, supra
note 71, at 75-80 and 84-87.
81. For a discussion of the deployment and activities of the riot troops, see Facts,
Figures on Internal Troops Discussed, FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, Feb. 1, 1990, at
72-73. See alsoJ. BUstrIL, supra note 71, at 78-80.
82. For Soviet press accounts of the Armenian demonstrations, see THE USSR
TODAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOViET PRESS, supra note 78, at 93-99.
83. FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, supra note 81.
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new law on social organizations is forecast for 1990.84 Meanwhile, a
long- uppressed and restless public has not waited for formal institu-
tionalization of the right of assembly. New groups have constantly
formed and taken to the streets to advocate on an extensive range of
public issues. Absent legislative direction, the municipal police have
apparently been given wide discretion as to what types of public advo-
cacy are appropriate or unacceptable in a lawful assembly, and which
demonstrations to disperse or tolerate.8 5 As can be imagined in a coun-
try as large and diverse as the Soviet Union, this discretion has resulted
in uneven and inequitable enforcement of demonstration law.8 6 For
instance, police usually break up demonstrations by the Democratic
Union, a group declaring itself a party in opposition to the CPSU, while
often leaving undisturbed activities by the group called "Memory," an
extreme Russian nationalist organization which promotes religious and
ethnic hatred. 87
c. Violence in Republics
When democratization was first introduced into the dialogue of restruc-
turing, Gorbachev and the Party, while not giving the concept any spe-
cific content, generally did intonate certain parameters for the right of
assembly. These parameters were that no border changes within the
USSR would be tolerated, a multi-party system would not be permitted,
and the use of assembly for purposes of advocating ethnic or religious
hatred would be forbidden. After five years of the often tumultuous and
chaotic process of reform in the Soviet Union, these parameters for pub-
lic behavior are rapidly breaking down. Given the rise of secessionist
movements, Gorbachev's acknowledgement of a defacto multi-party sys-
tem, and the now almost routine outbursts of ethnic violence between
Azeri and Armenian, Georgian and Ossetian, Uzbek and Meskhi, and
others,8 8 democratization seems to be increasingly leading to separatist
tendencies and large scale riotous assemblies.
84. For the drafting history to date of proposed legislation on the so-called
"informals," seeJ. BUSArIL, supra note 71, at 65-75.
85. See, e.g., Miliukov, Kak borot sia s 'neformalami'?, Leningradskaia militsiia, Mar.
11, 1989, at 7.
86. For example, up until the replacement of the hardline Party leader of the
Ukraine in the fall of 1989, the police in that republic routinely dispersed most
demonstrations.
87. For example, see the brief report of police action against an authorized dem-
onstration by the Democratic Union in Moscow in January 1990 in FBIS, Daily
Report: Soviet Union Jan. 19, 1990, at 115.
88. The fighting between Azeris and Armenians in early 1990 was one of the fac-
tors contributing to Gorbachev's request to the Supreme Soviet for stronger execu-
tive powers. See Clines, Gorbachev Forces Bill on Presidency Past Legislature, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col.4.
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Conclusion
The Soviet system has effectively suppressed civil unrest since the days
of Stalin. Although Stalin's jurisprudence of terror eventually evolved
into Brezhnev's more subtle administrative and political forms of polit-
ical justice, both approaches effectively held the masses in check.
Today, however, the Soviet people are demanding, even assuming, civil
rights unthinkable in the past. Gorbachev's ill-defined plans for glasnost
and democratization were swept up by the people and carried in unan-
ticipated directions. His provoking rhetoric, his promised legislation,
and the gradual erosion of fear among the masses have also largely con-
tributed to the aggressiveness of the people today.
Populist action is currently outstripping legislative initiative in the
Soviet Union. The people are assuming and acting upon defacto rights
before those rights are actually granted by the authorities (dejure). The
flux of. change in the Soviet Union does not permit a "conclusion" in the
usual sense. One can only observe that as the Soviet Union moves
toward constitutional government and codification of basic civil rights,
Moscow's authority within its internal empire is constantly contracting.
Social behavior, spurred on by glasnost and democratization, continues
to swirl out of control.8 9
89. This Article was completed on March 1, 1990. Since then the Lithuanian
Union Republic on March 11 declared its independence from the USSR, Gorbachev
began to implement his new strong executive presidency, and the USSR Supreme
Soviet passed a somewhat restrictive law governing the right of secession. In an
effort to regain some measure of control, Gorbachev began to use his new powers,
especially economic sanctions, to try to bring Lithuania back into the union, while the
Supreme Soviet began drafting a new law against defamation of the presidency. As
of mid-spring, no viable solutions to the quandaries of freedom and order in the
USSR were in sight.
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